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Sovereign Debt and Economic Growth in 
the European Monetary Union
Joseph Bakke
I. Introduction
 From the inception of the European Monetary 
Union, (EMU) the subject of sovereign debt has been 
of concern to economists and international policy 
makers in assessing the viability and efficiency of the 
euro area as a currency union. The recent European 
sovereign debt crises, potential exit of Greece, and 
increased international conversation regarding a 
Eurobond have make it evident that levels of sover-
eign debt in the EMU are foreground considerations 
for policy makers moving forward. According to the 
European Commission, total government debt as a 
percentage of GDP in the euro area rose to 92.9% in 
the first quarter of 2015. While this figure may seem 
daunting, its interpretation must be considered in the 
context of the EMU’s macroeconomic design. 
 The 19 EMU member states are the first 
example of a multinational currency union to which 
Robert Mundell’s (1961) theory of optimum currency 
area (OCA) may be applied. The essence of this theory 
is that if a currency area is to enjoy increased financial 
efficiency through a monetary union, (and also avoid 
negative consequences) its member states must hold 
common conditions in a number of variables such 
as labor mobility, capital mobility, price and wage 
flexibility, risk structure, and business cycle periodic-
ity. Originally, OCA theory was strictly a theoretical 
construct. However, it was later expanded upon to 
the point that it became instrumental to producing 
the Euro convergence criteria of the 1992 Maastricht 
Treaty. 
 One criteria of the Maastricht Treaty is the 
amount of outstanding sovereign debt as a percent-
age of GDP a potential member may have. In order 
for a nation to enter the EMU, its percentage of gross 
government debt relative to GDP must be less than 
60% in the year preceding. This condition is directly 
related to one of Mundell’s original considerations, 
the similarity of risk structure in a currency union. 
Specifically, significant discrepancies in government 
debt across a currency union could induce variance in 
the risk structure that compromises investor senti-
ment towards the union as a whole. 
 Considering the convergence criterion for 
sovereign debt remaining less than 60% of GDP, it 
becomes reasonable to pose the question of whether 
or not the EMU can still be considered an optimal 
currency area when the aggregation of the union’s 
public debt stands at 93.7% of GDP. To address this 
question in an empirical manner, one must simultane-
ously take into account the other euro convergence 
criteria, which will not be addressed here. Instead, 
this research will focus more directly on sovereign 
debt and its relationship with economic growth. Spe-
cifically, this work aims to identify the magnitude by 
which government debt as a percentage of GDP has 
affected economic growth in the EMU. This topic is 
of importance to the EMU as debt crises such as the 
outstanding one in Greece are not unforeseeable in 
other highly indebted nations such as Italy, Ireland, 
Portugal, and Spain. Thus, relevant information on 
the magnitude by which increases in debt-to-GDP 
ratios are adversely affecting economic growth across 
the union is necessary. The claim that sovereign debt 
is in fact having a negative effect on economic growth 
in the EU makes reference to the work of Checherita 
and Rother (2010) of the European Central Bank. This 
study finds that elevated sovereign debt has a non-
linear negative impact on GDP-per-capita growth 
starting at the 90%-100% threshold. Their research 
also suggests that the negative growth effect of high 
government debt might be linear starting at the 70%-
80% threshold. The contribution of the research done 
here is to update and further the body of work on this 
topic by addressing the magnitude by which sovereign 
debt has affected economic growth in the EMU. 
II. Literature Review
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 The relationship between sovereign debt 
and GDP per capita is entangled with several of the 
more prominent theoretical macroeconomic models. 
Public debt has both positive and negative effects on 
components of AS-AD, IS-LM, and Solow models 
as they pertain to GDP per capita. Thus, analyzing 
these effects in a multivariate context is important 
to establishing a robust theory of sovereign debt and 
economic growth. 
This analysis begins with the seminal work of Modi-
gliani (1961) exploring the effects of government 
debt in an aggregate growth model. Modigliani’s 
work attempts not only to define the relationship 
between public debt and economic growth over time, 
but also to assess the burden of its transference in a 
multi-generational context. While his work on debt 
transference is seminal to the study of generational 
accounting, this review will focus primarily on the 
sign and magnitude of the relationship between debt 
and GDP components he establishes. Modigliani 
shows that as growth in debt occurs, respective linear 
reductions in net worth, over-life consumption, and 
capital formation follow within a single generation. 
In the context of macroeconomic theory, reductions 
in any of these variables have a negative effect on 
GDP. 
 Citing Modigliani, Diamond (1965) extends 
the theory of public debt by applying it in the context 
of a neoclassical growth model. Here the effects of 
reductions in capital stock are explicitly accounted 
for. Furthermore, Modigliani’s conclusions are 
examined in the context of consumption decisions 
made by individuals. By doing this, Diamond shows 
that the reduction in capital stock is two-fold. There 
is a reduction in an individual’s savings as well as a 
substitution of private capital for government debt in 
the individual’s portfolio. This suggests the negative 
effects of debt are of greater magnitude than Modi-
gliani suggests. 
 Further theoretical development comes from 
Friedman (1978) who extends but also critiques the 
conclusions of Modigliani and Diamond. Using a 
model based on real capital, money, and government 
bonds, Friedman shows that the portfolio effect de-
scribed by Diamond is subject to the substitutability 
of assets in the public’s aggregate portfolio. Because 
of this, the issuing of government debt may not 
always result in a “crowding out” effect, but in some 
cases may actually “crowd in” investment. In other 
words, the government’s choice of debt instrument 
is of considerable importance to the effect debt will 
have on growth, a factor not accounted for by Modi-
gliani or Diamond. 
 Possibly the most prominent empirical 
research regarding public debt in an international 
context is provided by Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) 
who attempt to define a systematic relationship 
between elevated debt levels, growth, and inflation. 
These findings are based on a panel data set of 44 
countries spanning nearly 200 years. Reinhart and 
Rogoff make the important distinction of analyzing 
debt’s effects based on threshold levels. Using this 
method, they find that countries with debt levels 
above 90% of GDP experience notably lower growth 
rates. Additionally, they find that the relationship 
between public debt and growth is similar across ad-
vanced and emerging markets. This finding is a point 
of significant controversy in other research. 
 Herndon et al. (2013) suggest that Reinhart 
and Rogoff ’s methodological processes inaccurately 
skew the results of 20 countries. This methodology is 
claimed to estimates lower GDP growth rates by ap-
proximately 2%. Instead, Herndon et al. find that the 
there is no dramatic difference in GDP growth levels 
above the 90% debt threshold. In addition, their 
research contests the similarity of effects across time 
and country, finding the relationship varies signifi-
cantly with respect to these variables. 
 Research using similar methodology has 
been conducted in the EMU. Checherita and Rother 
(2010) of the European Central Bank apply the 
threshold regression model to a panel data set of 
twelve EMU countries dating back to 1970. They find 
that in the case of the euro area, the negative effects 
of high sovereign debt begin at the 70%-80% thresh-
old and become non-linear at 90%-100%. The valid-
ity of this methodology has not been contested as in 
the case of Reinhart and Rogoff. 
 The methodology being employed in this 
research is pooled OLS regression and not threshold 
regression as is in the empirical works above. How-
ever, the work done in threshold regression remains 
important to the discussion in that levels of sovereign 
debt in the euro area are now within the 90% debt 
threshold, which has been suggested to have non-lin-
ear negative effects on growth. This research updates 
the analysis of Checherita and Rother by determin-
ing the magnitude of correlation between sovereign 
debt growth and GDP per capita growth in a modern 
context. 
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III. Data and Methodology
  Data were collected from the World Bank’s 
World Development Indicators (WDI) database. This 
database contains 1,343 aggregated series gathered 
from the regulatory institutions of 249 nations. An-
nual frequency is the given periodicity, as it is the 
highest frequency with which this data exists. Ob-
servations range from 1992, the signing of the Maas-
tricht treaty, to 2012, the last observation. The Maas-
tricht treaty is taken as a starting point because of its 
introduction of the 60% debt threshold criterion. In 
other words, this date marks the start of preparation 
for EMU acceptance in the context of sovereign debt. 
The data examines variables from nineteen nations 
over a twenty-year range. Thus, the data structure is 
cross-sectional time series or panel. This structure 
provides for a significantly larger sample size than 
using aggregates. The panel structure takes into 
account all 20 observations from each country and 
combines them into a pooled series, extending the 
potential sample size from 20 to 380. 
 All series are transformed into annual per-
centage growth rates. This means that instead of 
using stock values of each variable over time, annual 
percentage changes are observed. Additionally, this 
transformation induces stationarity, a necessary as-
sumption for OLS estimation. Apart from this, the 
only additional transformation is the conversion of 
nominal GDP-to-capita to real GDP-per-capita using 
the GDP-deflator. This transformation removes the 
effects of inflation over time.
 The dependent variable in this model is GDP-
per-capita growth. The independent variable is the 
growth of Sovereign debt as a percentage of GDP. 
Growth in capital formation as weighted by GDP, 
population, prevalence of secondary education, and 
trade openness are also included as control variables 
in order to take into account other components of 
GDP growth. 
 The upward trend in the aggregated level 
of Sovereign debt for the 19 countries illustrates 
a 41.89% increase from 1992 to 2012. The aver-
age amount of debt during this time is 62.67%. The 
minimum can be observed in 2003 at 48.22% and the 
maximum in 2012 at 83.96%. As was stated in the 
introduction, current estimates suggest this debt has 
continued to rise as high as 93% this year. There are 
no significant outliers that need to be removed in ei-
ther the nation specific data or euro area aggregation 
series. Thus, all observations are taken into account. 
Aggregate GDP per capita registered downward 
movement over this interval. The largest decrease oc-
curred from 2007 to 2009 when growth fell to nearly 
-4%. This value is also the minimum of the series. 
The maximum can be observed in 2007 at 5%. The 
average GDP growth over this interval is 1.44%.   
  The strength of this data set is that it contains 
information on the relationship between sovereign 
debt and GDP-per-capita in three distinctly differ-
ent macroeconomic contexts: the period of prepara-
tion for Euro Convergence, the commencement of 
the EU, and the period following the 2007 financial 
crisis. One limitation of this data is the absence of 
observations past 2012.  
 The statistical method employed in this 
research is pooled ordinary least squares regression. 
This method derives an estimation equation com-
posed of pooled series for all 19 euro area members 
over time. Taking control variables into account, this 
model explains GDP-per-capita growth in the Euro 
Area as a function of a constant, weighted investment 
growth, population growth, secondary education 
growth, trade openness growth, growth in sovereign 
debt as a percentage of GDP, and an error term be-
tween. This estimation equation is provided below. 
%Δ(GDP/P)it = α + βit%Δ(I/GDP) - χ¬it%Δ(P) + 
δit%Δ(SE) +φit%Δ(TO) - γit%Δ(D/GDP) + εit
 In macroeconomic theory, investment is a 
positively related component of GDP and is thus 
suggested to have a positive coefficient. Popula-
tion growth is suggested to have a negative correla-
tion with GDP-per-capita in reference to the Solow 
model. Output per worker is on the Y-axis of the 
Solow model, or output divided by population. Thus, 
as population increases in the denominator, there 
will be a negative effect on GDP per capita. However, 
the argument can also be made that the positive ef-
fect induced by an increase in labor may actually be 
greater and cause a net increase in GDP. Thus, the 
suggested sign in the case of population is unclear. 
Secondary education is suggested to have a positive 
coefficient as increases in human capital positively af-
fect productivity. Trade Openness is shown to have a 
positive relationship with GDP growth by Gries and 
Redlin (2015) and is thus suggested to have a positive 
coefficient in this context as well. Similarly, referenc-
ing the work of Checherita and Rother (2010) who 
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showed a negative relationship between sovereign 
debt and per-capita growth in the euro area, sover-
eign debt is predicted to have a negative coefficient. 
 One advantage of this model is its multiple 
control variables, which take into account other 
contributing factors to GDP-per-capita in order 
to place the coefficient of sovereign debt in proper 
context. However, this strength has a correspond-
ing limitation in that the multiple control variables 
incur a larger adjusted R-squared penalty that could 
potentially inhibit explanatory power of the model as 
a whole. 
IV. Results
 As stated previously, all variables are trans-
formed into growth rates in order to compare chang-
es over time as well as induce stationarity. Panel 
unit root tests are performed in order to verify this 
stationarity. The null hypothesis of presence of a unit 
root is rejected by the panel unit root test for all six 
variables at the 99% confidence level. Following this, 
regression coefficients are estimated for the following 
equation using Eviews statistical software. 
%Δ(GDP/P)it = α + βit%Δ(I/GDP) - χ¬it%Δ(P) + 
δit%Δ(SE) +φit%Δ(T) - γit%Δ(D/GDP) + εit
 Upon reviewing the p-values for secondary 
education and trade, it can be concluded that these 
two variables are not statistically significant and thus 
are not retained in the final estimation equation. 
Additionally, in order to decrease the probability of 
autocorrelation, a one period lag term of the depen-
dent variable is included. Following these alterations, 
the constant and final estimation coefficients are 
estimated.
%Δ(GDP/P)it =  1.3269 + (.2349)%Δ(GDP/P) t-1  + 
(.2020)%Δ(I/GDP) +  (-.8231)%Δ(P) + 
(-.03927)%Δ(D/GDP) + εit
 The estimation indicates that the mean 
value of GDP per capita growth across the EMU is 
1.3269%. The sign and magnitude of the independent 
variables’ effects on GDP per capita growth are also 
observable. The value of GDP per capita growth one 
year prior to observation is positively correlated with 
the present observation. Its coefficient, 0.2349, indi-
cates that a 1% increase in GDP per capita growth 
in a given year increases GDP per capita growth by 
0.2349% the following year. This variable is statisti-
cally significant at the 99% confidence level. Capital 
formation as weighted by GDP is also positively cor-
related with GDP per capita growth. The coefficient 
0.2020 indicates that a 1% increase in capital forma-
tion growth increases GDP per capita growth by 
0.2020%. This variable is significant at the 99% con-
fidence level. Population growth is observed to have 
a negative correlation with GDP per capita growth. 
Its coefficient, -0.8231, indicates that a 1% increase in 
population growth reduces GDP per capita growth 
by 0.8231%. This variable is statistically significant 
at the 99% confidence level. Finally, growth in sov-
ereign debt is negatively correlated with GDP per 
capita growth. The coefficient -0.0393 indicates that 
a 1% increase in sovereign debt growth reduces GDP 
per capita growth by 0.0393%. This relationship is 
also statistically significant at the 99% confidence 
interval. 
 It is important to observe the variance in 
magnitude of these coefficients. The coefficient of 
population growth is approximately .79% larger than 
the coefficient of sovereign debt growth. This can be 
explained by the fact that population is in the de-
nominator of the dependent variable itself, whereas 
sovereign debt growth is not itself a component of 
GDP per capita. This variance is not observed in 
the positive coefficients, .2349 and .2020, which are 
similarly about .6% lower in absolute value than the 
coefficient of population growth. 
 The adjusted R-squared of this estimation 
equation is .7931, which indicates that approximately 
79% of the variance in the GDP per capita growth 
rate can be explained by this model. The F-statistic, 
used to assess the overall statistical significance, is 
146.2472, which rejects the null hypothesis of in-
significance at the 99% confidence level.  Residual 
diagnostic tests are performed to determine whether 
or not the coefficients are best linear unbiased esti-
mations of the dependent variable. The Jarque-Bera 
statistic, 41.8793, indicates that the residuals are 
normally distributed at the 99% confidence interval. 
The means of concretely testing for heteroscedastic-
ity are not available due to the structure of this data 
set. Thus, the estimated standard errors have been 
adjusted for robustness in the presence of heterosce-
dasticity. 
V. Conclusions
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 The aim of this research has been to ana-
lyze the effect of sovereign debt growth on GDP per 
capita growth in the Euro Area over the interval 
1992-2012. The methodology employed here is linear 
ordinary least squares regression. These findings 
indicate that both investment as weighted by GDP 
and a one period lag term of the dependent vari-
able have positive effects on GDP per capita growth. 
These coefficients are .2020 and 0.2349 respectively. 
Population growth and sovereign debt growth are 
observed to have negative effects on GDP per capita 
growth. The coefficients of these variables are -.8231 
and -.0393 respectively. 
 The theoretical models put forth by Modi-
gliani (1961) suggest that capital formation is the 
mechanism by which sovereign debt growth nega-
tively affects economic growth. In order to determine 
if this is the case in the euro area, this research would 
have to be combined with an analysis of the relation-
ship between sovereign debt growth and capital for-
mation. This is one logical extension of this research 
going forward. 
 In regards to the relationship between Sover-
eign debt and GDP per capita growth, the negative 
relationship observed is consistent with Modigliani’s 
seminal theoretical models as well as the empirical 
work of Checherita and Rother (2010). The results 
also serve as evidence in support of Rheinhart and 
Rogoff ’s (2010) claim that debt levels near the 90% 
threshold have negative effects on GDP per capita 
growth. The essential difference between this work 
and previous research is the choice of methodol-
ogy. This study establishes the negative relationship 
using ordinary least squares as opposed to threshold 
regression. Because of this, it cannot be determined 
whether or not the magnitude of this negative re-
lationship is consistent with the existing literature. 
However, it can be said that the negative relationship 
Checherita and Rother observed in the Euro Area in 
2010 is still present. 
 There are multiple avenues of future research 
that could contribute to a better understand of the 
way debt is affecting economic growth in the euro 
area. One way would be to examine the same data 
using threshold regression methodology to further 
update the previous literature. Another would be to 
research whether or not Modigliani’s theory that debt 
growth adversely affects economic growth through 
capital formation holds in this case. If a negative 
relationship were to be identified between these two 
variables, the combination of such a relationship 
with the one found in this research would validate 
the application of Modigliani’s model. Finally, this 
same analysis could be applied to other collections of 
countries within specific geographical regions.
 The established negative relationship between 
sovereign debt growth and GDP per capita growth 
found in this research could serve as supporting 
evidence for European Union policy makers who 
aim to decrease debt levels towards the 1992 OCA 
criterion levels. However, it should be noted that the 
magnitude by which this negative relationship exists 
has not been clarified in the context of debt thresh-
olds and cannot be relevant to specific debt threshold 
criteria. Instead, it can be claimed that governments 
who have taken on elevated debt in an attempt to 
stimulate economic activity through added expendi-
ture have been hindered by the negative relationship 




Estimation Results of Panel Regression Model of 
GDP per capita Growth 
Bloomington-Normal, McLean County, IL 
November 2015
Depend Variable: GDP per capita Growth, N = 257
Median GDP growth    1.3269***
               (7.2966)
One year lag of GDP Growth             0.2349***
               (6.9096)
Capital Formation Growth  0.2020***
              (19.3759)
Population Growth   -0.8231***
               (-2.6683)
Sovereign Debt Growth  -0.0393***
               (-5.5376)
Adjusted R-squared    0.7931
s.e. equation     1.8011
Residual Diagnostics test
Normality    41.8793 a***
Significance at the 1%(***) level (t-values in paren-
thesis) a Values of Jarque-Bera statistical test for 
Normality




Panel unit root test: Summary
Sample: 1992 2015    
Exogenous variables: Individual effects  
User-specified lags: 1    
Newey-West automatic bandwidth selection and 
Bartlett kernel
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